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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Michael F. Urbanski*
Francis H. Casola*
James R. Creekmore*"
I. INTRODUCTION
Consistent with the recent national trend, antitrust claims in
Virginia met with little success in Virginia's courts over the
past two years. Not only have the number of antitrust com-
plaints dwindled, but those that are filed are routinely dis-
missed on the pleadings or by means of summary judgment
after discovery. Recent antitrust conspiracy actions have failed
for a variety of fundamental reasons, including a lack of
standing to bring the action and a lack of a multiplicity of ac-
tors capable of engaging in a conspiracy. On the whole, monop-
olization claims fared no better, and have been dismissed large-
ly because of the absence of any evidence of adverse impact on
competition. This article addresses federal and state legislative
development and enforcement activities, and antitrust decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and state and federal courts of Virginia for the past
two years.
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II. CIVIL ANTITRUST ACTIONS
A. Statute of Limitations and the Fraudulent Concealment
Doctrine: Milk Price Fixing Saga Ends
Plaintiff Supermarket of Marlinton (Marlinton), a small retail
supermarket in Marlinton, West Virginia, brought a putative
class action against Meadow Gold Dairies and other dairies
(collectively "the Dairies"), alleging that the Dairies engaged in
a price fixing conspiracy with regard to wholesale milk prices in
southwestern Virginia and southeastern West Virginia in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' In its complaint, filed in
September, 1993, Marlinton alleged the existence of such con-
spiracy from 1984 through 1987.2 The district court granted the
Dairies' summary judgment motion, finding that the Clayton
Act's four year statute of limitations was not tolled, and, there-
fore, barred Marlinton's action. This decision, however, was
overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in an opinion clarifying the standard for appli-
cation of the fraudulent concealment doctrine in this circuit.'
On remand and following further discovery, the Dairies re-
newed their motions for summary judgment on a limited factual
record. The Dairies argued that Marlinton's action should be
dismissed because Marlinton (1) lacked standing due to its
inability to demonstrate that it was injured in fact by the al-
leged conspiracy;4 (2) could not demonstrate affirmative acts of
concealment necessary to toll the four year statute of limita-
tions, as required by the Fourth Circuit;5 and (3) failed to exer-
cise due diligence to uncover the alleged conspiracy despite its
own suspicions of such conspiracy.6 By Order and Memoran-
1. See Supermarket of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., No. 93-0968-R,
slip op. at 1 (W.D. Va. Nov. 14, 1996) (order and memorandum opinion denying sum-
mary judgment).
2. See id. at 2.
3. See Supermarket of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119 (4th
Cir. 1995).
4. See Marlinton, slip op. at 4.
5. See id. at 10.
6. See id. at 11.
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dum Opinion entered by the district court on November 14,
1996, the court denied the Dairies' renewed motion.'
With respect to Marlinton's standing, the court found that
Marlinton offered sufficient evidence of direct purchases from
Meadow Gold, one of the alleged conspirators, during every year
of the alleged conspiracy.8 Relying on Mid-West Paper Products
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,' the court found the existence of
a question of fact as to such purchases sufficient to overcome
the Dairies' motions for summary judgment at that time.'0
With respect to the Dairies' arguments regarding the absence
of affirmative acts of concealment necessary to toll the statute
of limitations, the court, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to Marlinton, declined to distinguish the alleged acts
of concealment with respect to rigging bids to public school
districts from the alleged conspiracy to fix the price of whole-
sale milk." The court accepted, for the purposes of the Dairies'
motion for summary judgment, that the alleged acts of secrecy
surrounding both the school milk and wholesale conduct be
considered and held that Marlinton alleged sufficient affirma-
tive acts of concealment to create a jury issue with respect to
fraudulent concealment.' Moreover, the court held that
Marlinton need not establish that it was "actively misled" by
the Dairies' conduct in order to satisfy the fraudulent conceal-
ment test."
Finally, the court found that Marlinton produced sufficient
evidence to defeat summary judgment on the issue of due dili-
gence. Although Marlinton's officers generally were suspicious
about price fixing activities, the court noted that such general
suspicions did not indicate they were or should have been on
notice about the price fixing scheme at issue.'4 The court rec-
ognized the relative isolation of Marlinton, West Virginia, from
states such as Florida, Georgia, Alabama, New York, and other
7. See id. at 1-2.
8. See iUL at 5.
9. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
10. See Marlinton, slip op. at 5.
11. See id at 9.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 10.
14. See id at 13.
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western states, in which milk price-fixing conspiracies gained
widespread publicity during the time period in question. 5 As
such, the court held that articles in newspapers about the other
conspiracies were irrelevant and would not be considered as
having put Marlinton on notice of the alleged conspiracy in this
case. 6 Thus, Marlintoi's claims survived the Dairies' due dili-
gence challenge as well.
The Dairies argued that, because Marlinton's officers conced-
ed that they exercised no diligence and undertook no efforts to
uncover the conspiracy, they could not satisfy that element of
the fraudulent concealment standard. Essentially, the Dairies
argued that an admission by Marlinton that it exercised no dili-
gence prevents the application of the fraudulent concealment
exception. Rejecting this argument, the court held that "defen-
dants have not produced sufficient uncontradicted evidence to
conclude that Marlinton was or should have been aware of facts
that should have excited further inquiry. Accordingly, I find
that Marlinton was under no duty to investigate its claim." 7
The court's ruling, ostensibly freeing the party asserting
fraudulent concealment from exercising any diligence, may be
called into question by the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Klehr v. Smith Corp."s In Klehr, a civil RICO case
analogous to antitrust case law in the fraudulent concealment
context, the United States Supreme Court addressed a split in
the circuits concerning the requirement of "reasonable diligence"
on the part of a plaintiff relying on the fraudulent concealment
doctrine. The Court resolved the split in the circuits by conclud-
ing that "reasonable diligence' does matter, and a plaintiff who
is not reasonably diligent may not assert 'fraudulent conceal-
ment."' The Court further noted that "we cannot say that the
'fraudulent concealment' is concerned only with the behavior of
defendants. For that reason, and in light of the consensus of
15. See id. at 14.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997).
19. Id. at 1993.
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authority, we conclude that 'fraudulent concealment' in the
context of civil RICO embodies a 'due diligence' requirement."0
After further discovery, however, the Dairies reasserted their
motion for summary judgment on standing grounds.2 This mo-
tion was premised on the deposition testimony of the only wit-
ness who indicated that collusive discussions had occurred.'
Largely because that witness indicated that any discussions he
had with other dairies had no application to the named plain-
tiffs, the court granted summary judgment for the Dairies.'
B. Sherman Act Section 1
1. Conspiracy Issues
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has displayed
little tolerance over the past two years for Sherman Act claims
that failed to measure up to accepted standards of pleading and
practice for such actions. For example, in four per curiam opin-
ions, three of which were a mere paragraph in length, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district courts' dismissals of actions,
two on summary judgment motions24 and two on motions to
dismiss. 25
Most recently, in Howerton v. Grace Hospital, Inc.,26 the
Fourth Circuit afred the decision of the District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina in granting summary
judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs, Drs. Howerton and Antley,
practicing under the name Blue Ridge Radiology Associates,
20. Id-
21. See Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc., Nos. 93-0968-R & 96-0407-R (W.D.Va.
Aug. 27, 1997) (Mem.).
22. See id. at 12.
23. See id. at 16.
24. See Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) S 71,547 (4th
Cir. Sept. 4, 1996); Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master
Corp., 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. July 24, 1996) (text available at 1996 WL 412584).
25. See Dehoney v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, No. 95-7270, 1995 WL
736863 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1995); Binder v. Washington Gas-District of Columbia Divi-
sion, No. 95-2946. 1996 WL 73705 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 1996).
26. No. 95-2549, 1996 WL 498095 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996). In reaching its deci-
sion, the district court relied upon the recommendations of the magistrate judge. See
Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., No. 4:90CV187, 1995 WL 787529 (W.D.N.C. July 7,
1995) (memorandum and order).
1997] 947
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P.A., (Blue Ridge), provided radiology services to Grace Hospital
(Grace) from 1984 to 1990 pursuant to a non-exclusive written
contract." In 1990, when Blue Ridge proceeded with its plans
of opening an outpatient imaging facility, Grace terminated its
contract with Blue Ridge on ninety days notice and approached
Piedmont Medical Imaging, P.C. (PMI) to replace Blue Ridge as
provider of radiological services.' In April of 1990, Grace and
PMI entered into an exclusive contract." Plaintiffs subse-
quently filed suit against Grace and PMI, alleging violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by means of a tying arrangement,
exclusive dealing and unreasonable restraint of trade. 0
The district court rejected plaintiffs' exclusive dealing claim
on the grounds that they had failed to show concerted action
between two legally distinct economic entities."' The court
found that plaintiffs had failed to establish anything other than
unilateral conduct on the part of Grace, since Grace alone de-
cided to terminate Blue Ridge's contract as a provider of radiol-
ogy services. 2 The fact that PMI was interested in entering
into a contract with Grace to provide the same services did not
show a combination or concerted action to restrain trade as
required under a Section 1 claim.'
The district court also found that the Grace/PMI contract was
not an unreasonable restraint on trade, that the contract had
not been shown to lessen competition, and that it might even
encourage competition and improve care and prices in outpa-
tient services, since the contract provided that PMI could be
terminated without cause upon 180 days notice.' The district
court noted that the Fourth Circuit previously rejected similar
claims in Steur v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.5 The dis-
27. See id. at *2-3.
28. See id. at *4.
29. See id.
30. See id. at *6.
31. See id. at *7. The court noted that 'a plaintiff claiming a § 1 violation must
first establish a combination or some form of concerted action between at least two
legally distinct economic entities. Unilateral conduct on the part of a single person or
enterprise falls outside the purview of this provision in the antitrust law." Id. at *6
(quoting Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537,
542 (2d Cir. 1993).
32. See id.
33. See id
34. See id. at *8-10.
35. 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987), aft'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. May 10, 1988)
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trict court quoted with approval from the court's decision in
Steur, noting 'reduced to its essentials, plaintiffs' [claims] rest
[ ] not on any showing of lessened competition, but merely on
the fact that they are disappointed competitors who must now
provide their services elsewhere."
Plaintiffs' main complaint was that their ability to acquire
outpatient business was damaged by their inability to also
perform inpatient radiology services at Grace, since they no
longer had day-to-day contact with referring physicians." As
the court noted, however, the number of referrals Blue Ridge
received after its split with Grace did not decrease.' Moreover,
plaintiffs failed to show that they could not acquire staff privi-
leges at another nearby hospital.39 The court explained that
'[m]erely changing exclusive contractors ... cannot constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws.' This is true despite the fact
that substituting one exclusive contractor for another may have
the consequence of 'boycotting or shutting out' the displaced
contractor."4
The court also rejected plaintiffs' tying claim.41 Since Grace
did not share any portion of the fees generated by PMI,
plaintiffs had no economic interest in such arrangement and did
not directly benefit from the sale of the *tied product." There-
fore, as a matter of law, there could be no unlawful tying
arrangement, either under the per se or rule of reason ap-
proaches.' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in a per curiam, one-paragraph
decision.4
The Fourth Circuit also considered antitrust claims in a dis-
pute involving the real estate industry in Montgomery County
(text available at 1988 WL 46286).
36. Howerton, 1995 WL 787529, at *8 (quoting Steur, 672 F. Supp. at 1501).
37. See id.
38. See id-
39. See id.
40. Id- at *10 (quoting Steur, 672 F. Supp. at 1502).
41. See id. at *11.
42. See id.
43. See i&.
44. See Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 96 F.3d 1438 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996) (text
available at 1996 WL 498095).
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Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp.45 Relying
on the district court's analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
court's grant of summary judgment for Montgomery County
Association of Realtors (MCAR) on each of Realty Photo's anti-
trust counterclaims."
Plaintiff MCAR published the "multiple listing service"
(MLS), a directory of real estate listed for sale in the Montgom-
ery County, Maryland, area and provided the MLS to its mem-
bers for a fee. MCAR also provided a computerized version of
the MLS which did not contain photographs of the listings.
47
Realty Photo began to fill this void by accessing the computer-
ized MLS, obtaining the addresses of new listings, photograph-
ing the listings, and downloading the photographs into its
customers' personal computers.4 MCAR learned of Realty
Photo's activities and demanded that it cease accessing the
MLS.49 MCAR then sued Realty Photo for copyright infringe-
ment, unfair competition, unauthorized wiretapping, misappro-
priation of trade secrets, and breach of contract.0 In response,
Realty Photo counterclaimed, alleging that MCAR and certain
realtors conspired to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Specifically, Realty Photo argued that it was
the victim of a concerted refusal to deal, of a denial of access to
an essential facility, and of an illegal tying arrangement.51
Distinguishing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe
Corp.,52 the district court initially determined that, unlike a
corporation and its subsidiaries, an association, which is noth-
ing more than a group of persons combined for a common pur-
pose, can conspire with itself for purposes of the Sherman
Act.53 The court found, however, that Realty Photo failed to
establish the second element of its Sherman Act claim, namely,
45. 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996).
46. See Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp.,
878 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1995).
47. See id. at 808.
48. See id. at 808-09.
49. See id. at 809.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
53. See Montgomery, 878 F. Supp. at 815-16.
950
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION
that MCAR's conduct unreasonably restrained trade.' Recog-
nizing that courts have found refusal to deal claims viable
when realtors exclude competitors from a real estate associa-
tion," the court distinguished Realty Photo's status and ac-
tions from those realtors seeking access to the market. Here,
Realty Photo merely sought access to MCAR's copyrighted ma-
terials, not to MCAR's association as a member. The court
noted that the antitrust laws do not mandate that MCAR give
Realty Photo free access to its copyrighted materials in order to
allow Realty Photo to compete with it more effectively."
Finally, the court found that Realty Photo "utterly failed to
bring forward evidence establishing the elements of the essen-
tial facilities rule."" Reluctantly dismissing Realty Photo's es-
sential facilities claim, the district court noted that "[t]his doc-
trine is probably the most germane of the antitrust doctrines
RPM advances. Making the required showings would have pre-
sented little apparent difficulty, given that MCAR freely con-
cedes that it owns the admittedly essential facility and that it
refuses RPM access to the facility."8 Because, however, Realty
Photo wholly failed to show that it cannot practically duplicate
the MLS, the court found that it had no choice but to grant
summary judgment for defendants as to this aspect of Realty
Photo's claim as well.59
In two other cases, the Fourth Circuit made short work of
affirming its own intolerance for poorly pled or meritless causes
of action. In Dehoney v. South Carolina Department of Correc-
tions,"o plaintiff, a South Carolina inmate, brought a pro se
action alleging that the Department of Corrections violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by requiring all prisoners to pur-
54. See id. at 816.
55. See id.
56. See id at 817.
57. Id. To establish a claim pursuant to the "essential facilities" doctrine, it is
necessary to establish (1) control by the defendant of the essential facility; (2) the in-
ability of the competitor seeking access to practically or reasonably duplicate the
facility, (3) the denial of the facility to the competitor, and (4) the feasibility of the
monopolist to provide the facility. See Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 1991).
58. Montgomery, 878 F. Supp. at 817.
59. See id. at 819-20.
60. No. 95-7270, 1995 WL 736863 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1995).
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chase their goods from the prison canteen at a ten percent
markup.61 The magistrate judge recommended that the district
court grant the defendant's motion for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and noted that,
in adopting and enforcing the canteen program, South Carolina
"made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy
in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign,
imposed the restraint as an act of government which the
Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit."6 2 The district
court adopted the magistrate judge's report and dismissed the
action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),' which decision was affirmed
by the Fourth Circuit."
Shortly thereafter, in Binder v. Washington Gas-District of
Columbia Division," the Fourth Circuit affirmed, in a one
paragraph per curiam opinion, the district court's dismissal of
another pro se plaintiff's claim under the Sherman Act. The
Court adopted the reasoning of the district court, without the
benefit of oral argument."
Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Washington Gas
and the District of Columbia conspired to require plaintiff, an
owner of an eleven-unit apartment building in the District of
Columbia, to support financially the District of Columbia and
defendant's "race-based" programs, there by constituting a
"price-fixing and tie-in scheme in restraint of trade" in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.6" The court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that, although plaintiff
used the relevant vocabulary necessary to plead a Sherman Act
claim, he had not alleged with the required specificity the facts
necessary to support his claim.' For example, the court noted
61. See Dehoney v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, Nos. Civ.A3:94-3169-
21BD, Civ.A.0:94-3169-21BD & 1995 WL 842006 (D.S.C. July 31, 1995), affd, 72 F.3d
126 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1995) (text available at 1995 WL 736863).
62. Id. at *4.
63. See id. at *2.
64. See Dehoney 1995 WL 736863, at *1. Dehoney was also later denied relief on
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dehoney v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections,
No. 96-7391, 1997 WL 3178 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1997).
65. No. 95-2946, 1996 WL 73705 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 1996).
66. See Binder v. Washington Gas-Dist. of Columbia Div., No. 2:95CV319, 1995
WL 842001 (E.D. Va. Oct. 6, 1995).
67. See id. at *1.
68. See id. at *7.
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that the complaint lacked "any allegations of communications,
meetings, or other means through which one might infer the
existence of a conspiracy."
In Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. °
Judge James Harry Michael, Jr., in Charlottesville, considered
arguments on motions to dismiss in a battle between two major
miners of the mineral vermiculite in Central Virginia. De-
fendant Grace owned reserves in South Carolina, and both
Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. (VVL) and Grace owned mining
rights in Virginia, with the bulk of Virginia reserves located in
Louisa County." VVL owned mining rights in only a small
parcel of land in Louisa County, whereas Grace owned mining
rights in more than 1400 acres of land in the county represent-
ing more than eighty percent of the vermiculite deposits in
Virginia. 2 The Historic Green Springs, Inc. (HGSI), also a de-
fendant, is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized to
maintain the historic Green Springs area of Louisa County by,
among other things, opposing mining operations in and around
Louisa County. 3
In 1992 and 1994, Grace conveyed to HGSI certain parcels of
land in Louisa County subject to restrictive covenants prohibit-
ing the mining of vermiculite thereon. VVL thereafter brought
this antitrust action against Grace and HGSI alleging violations
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and their Virginia Anti-
trust Act counterparts. 4 VVL alleged that by removing more
than eighty percent of the vermiculite mining reserves in
Louisa County from the mining market, Grace and HGSI con-
spired to limit VVL's Virginia operations to its finite reserves,
69. Id.
70. 965 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Va. 1997).
71. See id. at 808. From the late 1970s to present, plaintiff VVL and defendant
Grace have mined the mineral vermiculite in the United States. Significantly, since
1990, Virginia and South Carolina have been the only two domestic areas in which
vermiculite has been mined. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 809.
74. Subsequent to the initial complaint, VVL filed two virtually identical com-
plaints against Grace, one by itself and the second with additional plaintiffs. See
Virginia Vermiculite, LTD. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., Civil Action No. 96-0012-C
(March 12, 1996) and Peers v. Grace & Co.-Conn., Civil Action No. 96-0013-C (March
12, 1996). Because of the identity of issues, parties, etc., the cases were consolidated
for resolution.
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with the effect of diminishing its ability to compete with Grace,
and thereby increased the value of Grace's South Carolina min-
eral reserves.75
In two Reports and Recommendations, U.S. Magistrate Judge
B. Waugh Crigler considered the case. 8 In his analysis, he fo-
cused on whether the joint action of Grace and HGSI constitut-
ed a restraint of trade, and whether VVL was injured thereby.
Reasoning that Grace could have held its property perpetually
without obligation to sell to anyone, Magistrate Judge Crigler
found that no one in the vermiculite mining market in Louisa
County, Virginia, could have had an expectation of acquiring
mining rights in the property before Grace conveyed it to
HGSI.77 Thus, Grace's restriction of mining rights pursuant to
its conveyance to HGSI could not constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Magistrate Judge Crigler found that, at most,
VVL pled facts showing a land transaction between a grantor,
who had no obligation to deal with VVL, and a grantee, who
similarly was unwilling to deal with VVL or any other party
wishing to mine vermiculite.78
In addition, Magistrate Judge Crigler found VVL's complaint
to contain insufficient allegations of actual adverse effects on
competition in the vermiculite mining market to state an anti-
trust claim arising out of the land transactions. Finding VVL's
failure to plead a restraint of trade or antitrust injury sufficient
to justify dismissal of the action, the Magistrate Judge deferred
ruling on whether HGSI, as a non-profit organization, could be
deemed to have been engaged in "interstate commerce" for
purposes of applying the Sherman Act to the land transactions
at issue.79
In district court, Judge Michael, in an expansive dissertation
on the history and principles of antitrust law, first considered
75. See Virginia Vermiculite, 965 F. Supp. at 809-10.
76. See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., Civil Action No. 96-
0013-C (W.D. Va. Sept. 19, 1996) (report and recommendation); Virginia Vermiculite,
Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., Civil Action No. 95-0015-C (W.D. Va. Sept. 19, 1995)
(report and recommendation).
77. See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd., Civil Action No. 95-0015-C, report and recom-
mendation at 9.
78. See id. at 9-10.
79. See Virginia Vermiculite, 965 F. Supp. at 10-11.
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whether Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to
defendant HGSI, a non-profit entity." Based upon legislative
history and precedent, the court concluded that, because HGSI
was not engaged in commercial activities, it should not be ex-
posed to antitrust liability.81 Judge Michael recognized that, al-
though HGSI had a stake in the market for vermiculite and
vermiculite mining rights, HGSI did not wish to suppress sup-
ply and dominate the market as a for-profit competitor would.
HGSI's goals, the court observed, were not designed to increase
the profit of HGSI, nor were they concerned with the price of
vermiculite or its mining rights. 2 The court was unpersuaded
by VVL's contrary arguments that the presence of Grace, a for-
profit competitor, as a co-conspirator changed this fact."
In support of its conclusion, the court compared HGSIs activ-
ities to that of anti-abortion activists and those opposed to the
sale of liquor, two groups whose activities have been held to be
-outside the reach of antitrust liability despite their effect on
competition." Judge Michael remarked: "the Act does not con-
trol the conduct of an eleemosynary organization pursuing pri-
marily political or social objectives, from which it does not re-
ceive pecuniary gain."85 For these reasons, Judge Michael dis-
missed HGSI as a defendant from each of the consolidated
actions.
HGSrs exemption from Sherman Act liability did not exempt
Grace, however. Judge Michael saw through Grace's thinly
veiled argument that a unity of anti-competitive intent or simi-
lar objectives on the part of both parties must be present before
a Section 1 conspiracy could exist. 6 The court found only that
both parties must have agreed to a certain course of conduct
80. See id. at 812.
81. See id. at 816.
82. See id. at 815.
83. See id. at 817.
84. See i&i; see also National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 617-23
(7th Cir. 1992).
85. Virginia Vermiculite, 965 F. Supp. at 813 (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 5.4e (1994)); see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTITRusT LAw § 10.2 (1985).
86. See Virginia Vermiculite, 965 F. Supp. at 818-19 ("Grace is led astray by the
language in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), emphasizing
the need for 'a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective.-).
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from which anti-competitive effects may arise, and that VVL
sufficiently had alleged such agreement to escape dismissal on
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion before the court.87
VVL's shortcoming, however, was found to lie in its allega-
tions of antitrust injury and the element of proximate causa-
tion. Upon examination of VVL's complaint, Judge Michael
found that VVL failed to allege that, without the allegedly
illegal restraint of trade, injury to VVL would have been avoid-
ed. In fact, Judge Michael noted that the opposite conclusion
was compelled: "that the alleged restraint was entirely superflu-
ous."' As alleged by VVL in its complaint, "[fior over 20 years,
HGSI conducted a campaign to obtain from Grace all of its
mining rights and other property interests in Louisa County."89
The court found that this allegation could not be reconciled
with the necessary, but lacking, allegation that, but for an
implicit or explicit agreement with Grace, HGSI would permit
vermiculite mining on donated conveyances. In other words,
there was no room for finding that Grace's agreement with
HGSI caused this restraint on trade; HGSI would have restrict-
ed the mining on such parcels without the inclusion of such
commitment in the agreement with Grace. 0 For these reasons,
the court dismissed all of VVL's Section 1 claims.9
2. Intracorporate Immunity
In the last two years, the intracorporate or intraenterprise
immunity doctrine has been recognized as alive and well, both
by the Fourth Circuit and in the Eastern District of Virginia,
as a protection against Sherman Act antitrust claims levied
against entities and their principals or agents.
In Patel v. Scotland Memorial Hospital,92 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a lower court's decision dismissing a physician's claims
against a hospital, its Chief Administrator, and its Chief of
87. See id. at 819.
88. Id. at 820.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 821.
91. See id.
92. No. 95-2704, 1996 WL 383920 (4th Cir. July 10, 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 767 (1997).
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Staff alleging, among other things, violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and North Carolina's Antitrust Act.93
Dr. Patel entered into a series of contracts with Scotland
Memorial Hospital (SMH) whereby she agreed to serve as the
hospital's Medical Director of the Department of Anesthesiology,
to provide twenty-four hour anesthesiology services for the
hospital and to direct SMH's certified registered nurse anesthe-
tists (CRNAs); SMH agreed not to enter into any other similar
contracts.94 The agreement between Dr. Patel and SMH also
required Dr. Patel to pass her medical boards within two years
of the start of her employment by SMH. Dr. Patel, however,
failed to pass the boards, and SMH terminated her contract
and withdrew her contract privileges. While she maintained
hospital privileges, the CRNAs were forbidden to work with
her.95 The lack of CRNAs to assist her practice allegedly pre-
vented Dr. Patel from maintaining a successful practice, and
she experienced a substantial decline in income.9
Regarding her Sherman Act claim, Dr. Patel alleged that the
hospital's prohibition of her use of CRNAs, which were essential
to her practice, was motivated by a malicious desire to harm
her practice. Citing both Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.,9 7 and Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital,98 the Fourth
Circuit found that this claim did not constitute (1) an agree-
ment between at least two legally distinct persons or entities,
or (2) an agreement imposing an unreasonable restraint on
trade"9 as set forth in Estate Construction Co. v. Miller &
Smith Holding Co."' Relying on its prior holding in Oksanen,
the court found that the Chief Administrator and Chief of Staff
clearly acted as agents of SMH, and therefore, together with
SMH, comprised a single entity with a unity of economic inter-
ests between them.' 1' Hence, they were protected by the
93. See id. at *2.
94. See id. at *1.
95. See id.
96. See id. at *4.
97. 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
98. 945 F.2d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
99. See Patel, 1996 WL 383920, at *6-7.
100. 14 F.3d 213, 220-21 (4th Cir. 1994).
101. See Patel, 1996 WL 383920, at *8.
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intracorporate or intraenterprise immunity doctrine of
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp."2
The Fourth Circuit easily disposed of Dr. Patel's attempt to
avoid the intraenterprise immunity doctrine by arguing that the
personal stake exception applied to SMH's stafing decision.'"'
The court reaffirmed its holding in Oksanen that the exception
applies only where the conspiring individual has a personal fi-
nancial interest in the conspiracy independent of the principal.
Here, none of the defendants had a direct economic interest in
Dr. Patel's status at SMH or competed with her. Hence, the
court found that the exception did not apply.'
Judge Ellis, in Alexandria, reached a similar conclusion in
Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp."5 In Williams, share-
holder residents of a cooperative apartment corporation who
were either unable or unwilling to participate in the conversion
of the co-op into condominium units brought suit against the
Co-op Corporation, the Condominium Association, and five indi-
vidual directors of both the Co-op Corporation and the Condo-
minium Association. Plaintiffs alleged that the increase in value
resulting from the conversion was enjoyed only by those resi-
dents who were able to participate in the conversion."3 Plain-
tiffs asserted state law claims based on breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty and alleged, among other things, that
defendants had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.07
Upon defendants' motion to dismiss all claims for failure to
state a claim, the district court granted the motion as to
plaintiffs' antitrust claims, but denied such motion as to
plaintiffs' remaining claims.' Ultimately, by subsequent
decision, the court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to all claims, dismissing plaintiffs' action in its
entirety."°
102. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
103. See Patel, 1996 WL 383920, at *8-10.
104. See id. at *9-10.
105. 891 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Va. 1995).
106. See id. at 1173.
107. See id. at 1174.
108. See id. at 1186.
109. See Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 901 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D. Va.
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Plaintiffs' suit was based on the following facts. In 1993, the
directors of the Co-op Corporation decided it would be in the
best interest of the shareholders if the apartment building units
were converted into condominium units."' To facilitate this
plan, the Condominium Association was formed to purchase all
the assets of the Co-op Corporation, and any profits resulting
from the transaction would be distributed pro rata to the share-
holders. The price set for the purchase of the units was the
market value of the units as co-ops rather than as condomini-
um units."' The Co-op Corporation's board used the co-op
market value despite the fact that it held appraisals showing
that the value of the units as condominiums was substantially
greater than that as co-op units." Plaintiff Co-op sharehold-
ers were either unwilling or unable to participate in the pur-
chase of their condominium units and were not allowed to
share in the appreciation of the units' market value. Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants conspired to both monopolize the mar-
ket for the building's nonparticipating and vacant units and to
fix prices for the sales of units."'
Dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claims, the district court held
that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a conspira-
cy between the named defendants." Citing Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp.,"5 the court noted that the
individual directors could not be deemed to have conspired with
either the Co-op Corporation or the Condominium Associa-
tion." '6 The court also held that the board defendants did not
have an independent stake in achieving the corporation's al-
leged illegal motive of approving the sale of the units, thereby
bringing them within the exception to the Copperweld doc-
trine." ' Although the directors, as Condominium Association
members, did enjoy a portion of any unjust enrichment the
Condominium Association may have received from the sale, the
1995).
110. See Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1172.
111. See id. at 1173.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1174.
114. See id. at 1176.
115. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
116. See Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1174.
117. See id. at 1174-75.
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court found that this interest was derived solely from their
affiliation with the Co-op Corporation and Condominium Associ-
ation, and was not separable for the purpose of finding a con-
spiracy."' Similarly, the court held that the Condominium As-
sociation was incapable of conspiring with the Co-op Corpora-
tion because, although not a subsidiary of the Co-op Corpora-
tion, it was a successor corporation with the same function,
directors, core of shareholders and unity of interest."'
The district court also held that the plaintiffs' claims of a
conspiracy to monopolize also failed because the key element to
such a claim, namely an agreement directed toward excluding
or lessening competition, was missing." The gravamen of the
plaintiffs' complaint was that the Condominium Association did
not pay a fair price for the assets. Cutting through the argu-
ments, the court correctly recognized that the effect of the sale
on competition would have been the same regardless of the sale
price; hence, the deal had no anti-competitive result."
3. Resale Price Fixing
The United States Supreme Court handed down a decision
November 4, 1997 in the matter of Khan v. State Oil Co.,'
in which it revisited the application of the per se rule to maxi-
mum vertical resale price fixing and, in the process, overruled
its 1968 decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co." Khan operated a
gas station under a contract with State Oil, a distributor of
gasoline and related products. Khan brought suit after State Oil
terminated the contract, alleging that State Oil's contract had
fixed the maximum price at which Khan could resell its gaso-
line in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." Specifical-
ly, the contract required Khan to rebate to State Oil the differ-
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1175 (citing Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 703 (4th
Cir. 1991)).
120. See id. at 1176.
121. See id.
122. 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997), vacating 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996).
123. See id. at 283-85 overruling Albrecht v. Herald, 390 U.S. 145 (1968). A full
discussion of this recent case is not possible here.
124. See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1360.
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ence between his higher prices and State Oil's suggested retail
price.'
The district court granted State Oil summary judgment after
applying the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, to
State Oil's alleged conduct.' The Seventh Circuit had no
trouble finding that the challenged contract provision amounted
to maximum price fixing by State Oil. After a detailed examina-
tion of the policies underlying application of the per se rule in
resale price fixing cases, the Seventh Circuit reversed, announc-
ing that, although it disagreed with the result, it was bound by
Supreme Court precedent. 7 The Seventh Circuit invited the
Supreme Court to reexamine its decision in Albrecht v. Herald
Co.,' in which it held that the per se rule was applicable to
maximum resale price fixing."2
In Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp.,"0  discussed
above, the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' antitrust claims,'' and, by subsequent decision,
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all
claims, dismissing plaintiffs' action in its entirety.'32 As with
plaintiffs' other antitrust claims, the district court held
plaintiffs' price-fixing claim to be meritless."' Plaintiffs ob-
jected to the price "fixed" by the Co-op Corporation and the
Condominium Association for their units. In dismissing this
claim, the court noted that the antitrust laws do not prohibit
"price-fixing" agreements between the buyer and seller of an
asset because every sale, of necessity, requires the setting of a
price." 4 The one-time sale involved did not rise to an
agreement to limit or establish future pricing actions, which the
Sherman Act prohibits."5
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 1367-69.
128. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
129. See id. at 152-54.
130. 891 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Va. 1995).
131. See id. at 1186.
132. See Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 901 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D. Va.
1995).
133. See Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1176.
134. See id.
135. See id at 1177-78.
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4. Injunctive Relief Disfavored
In Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines,3 ' the
Fourth Circuit considered a request for a preliminary injunction
predicated on a Sherman Act claim. Previously, TWA sued
Omega World Travel in Missouri state court alleging breaches
of Omega's obligations of loyalty and good faith when Omega,
over TWA's objections, persisted in marketing TWA tickets for a
company controlled by former TWA controlling shareholder Carl
Icahn."7 Omega reciprocated by suing TWA in the federal dis-
trict court for the Eastern District of Virginia on federal anti-
trust and state contract law grounds." After TWA allegedly
threatened termination of its agency relationship with Omega,
Omega sought and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing TWA from terminating the relationship."3 9 The Fourth Cir-
cuit stayed the injunction, and TWA terminated the relation-
ship."4 TWA then appealed the district court's grant of the
mandatory preliminary injunction.'
Reversing the district court's grant of the injunction, the
Fourth Circuit held that, as a matter of law, the Sherman Act
could not support an injunction requiring TWA to remain invol-
untarily in a contractual business relationship with Omega.'
The court reasoned that Omega sought and obtained the injunc-
tion to prevent the alleged harm that would result were its
agency relationship with TWA terminated." However,
Omega's underlying federal antitrust suit alleged that very
same relationship was invalid under the Sherman Act, and that
it had been injured by the continuation of an allegedly coerced
relationship.' The court held that "[wlhen the injury that the
movant seeks to prevent through a preliminary injunction is
not only unrelated, but directly contradictory to, the injury for
136. 111 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 1997).
137. See id. at 15.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 15-16.
143. See id. at 16.
144. See id.
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which it seeks redress in the underlying complaint," the injunc-
tion should not be issued.'45 The court also held that the pre-
liminary injunction could not be supported by Omega's state
law contract claims because they could not be successful."4
In Strauss v. Peninsula Regional Medical Center,'47 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of plaintiffs'
motion for injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.' There,
the plaintiff doctors had an exclusive contract with Peninsula
Regional Medical Center (PRMC) to provide radiation oncology
services. In 1992, the contract expired and PRMC began operat-
ing its radiation oncology department with an open staff.'49
Two years later, PRMC entered into discussions to purchase
from plaintiffs an independent radiation therapy facility. Those
plans fell through, and PRMC decided to enter into another
exclusive agreement for radiation oncology services with a third
practice group, Drake, Blumberg, that promulgated regulations
for physicians at PRMC facilities.5 0 Plaintiffs' group was un-
able to agree to new regulations, leading to the termination of
plaintiffs' privileges at PRMC.' Plaintiffs brought this action
seeking injunctive relief on the grounds that the termination of
their privileges constituted, among other things, a violation of
the Sherman Act.'52
Affirming the lower court's denial of plaintiffs' motion, the
appellate court found that there was no irreparable injury be-
cause plaintiffs' complaints could be properly addressed by a
monetary judgment, and any reputational injury to plaintiffs'
practice group was too speculative to merit injunctive relief."S
The court also held that the balance of hardships did not tip in
plaintiffs' favor because there would be continued strife at
PRMC if plaintiffs' practice group returned by court order."
145. Id.
146. See id. The court held that since the TWA-Omega contract was terminable "at
will, " both Virginia and Missouri law do not allow an implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing to override explicit contract terms. See id.
147. No. 95-2424, 1996 WL 265928 (4th Cir. May 20, 1996).
148. See id. at *6.
149. See id. at *3.
150. See id. at *3-4.
151. See id.
152. See id. at *4.
153. See id. at *1.
154. See id at *2 (citing Oksanen v. Page Mem'I Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 702-03 (4th
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The court noted that plaintiffs also had to overcome the fact
that Drake, Blumberg and the hospital were not separate actors
within the meaning of the Sherman Act.'55 In addition, the
court recognized that plaintiffs were alleging, at most, harm to
themselves as individual competitors rather than cognizable
harm to competition in general.156
C. Sherman Act Section 2: Monopolization Issues
In Howerton v. Grace Hospital, Inc.,"' the Fourth Circuit,
in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the decision of the district
court for the Western District of North Carolina which granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. As discussed
above," Blue Ridge had provided radiology services to Grace
Hospital from 1984 to 1990 pursuant to a non-exclusive written
contract. 5 ' In 1990, however, when Blue Ridge proceeded with
its plans of opening an outpatient imaging facility, Grace termi-
nated its contract with Blue Ridge on ninety days notice and
approached PMI to replace Blue Ridge as provider of radiolog-
ical services."o In April of 1990, Grace and PMI entered into
an exclusive contract. 6' Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit
against Grace and PMI, alleging violations of Sherman Act
Section 1 as well as violations of Sherman Act Section 2 by
monopolization and attempted monopolization."6
The court rejected plaintiff's Section 2 claim that the exclu-
sive contract with PMI effectively eliminated competition in the
outpatient radiology market."6 The court held that Grace
could not be held liable as a monopolist in Blue Ridge's product
market because Grace did not compete with Blue Ridge for
outpatient services and does not receive any portion of the fees
Cir. 1991).
155. See id.
156. See i.
157. No. 95-2549, 1996 WL 498095 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 26-43.
159. See Howerton, No. 4:90CV187, 1995 WL 787529, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 7,
1995).
160. See id. at *4.
161. See id.
162. See id. at *6.
163. See id. at *7-9.
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generated by PMI.' Moreover, the court concluded that PAI
had no "dangerous probability" of successful monopolization
because it could be terminated without cause under the con-
tract with Grace.1"e Also, the court ruled that PMI did not
have the specific intent necessary for a Section 2 claim because
Grace officials were the ones who had insisted that the contract
with PMI be exclusive."
The court also rejected plaintiffs' conspiracy to monopolize
claim on grounds that there was insufficient evidence for a jury
to find a conspiracy between Grace and PMI.' 7 In addition,
the court stated that the plaintiffs' monopoly leveraging claim,
even if recognized by the Fourth Circuit, must also fail because
defendants did not have monopoly power in the relevant mar-
kets.168
Judge James Harry Michael, Jr., of Charlottesville, has decid-
ed two complex Section 2 cases in the last eighteen months.
Most recently, in Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace &
Co.-Conn.,69  discussed above,' Judge Michael confronted
the claims of Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. (VVL) that W.R. Grace
& Co. (Grace), its competitor in the vermiculite mining indus-
try, had removed over eighty percent of the vermiculite mining
reserves in Louisa County from the mining market. VVL ar-
gued that this removal limited VVL's Virginia operations to its
finite reserves, thereby increasing the value of Grace's South
Carolina mineral reserves and diminishing VVL's opportunity to
compete with Grace.'
With respect to VVL's Sherman Act Section 2 claims, the
court noted at the outset that it was "persuaded that economic
reality probably supports [Grace's] position with respect to the
Section 2 claims against it." This observation notwithstand-
164. See id. at *11-12.
165. See id. at *12.
166. See id. at *13.
167. See id-
168. See id& at *12. In recent years, the Fourth Circuit has assumed the existence
of, but has yet to recognize a monopoly leveraging claim. See Advanced Health-Care
Serv. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 149, 149 n.17 (4th Cir. 1990).
169. 965 F. Supp. 802 (1997).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 69-90.
171. See Virginia Vermiculite, 965 F. Supp. at 808-09.
172. Id. at 821.
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ing, the court remarked that Grace's arguments were somewhat
premature at the summary judgment stage, given their focus on
the facts and evidence likely to be adduced.'7s The court
therefore found that VVL had stated sufficiently viable claims
of monopolization, 74  attempted monopolization. 7  and con-
spiracy to monopolize... against Grace to proceed.
Following a lengthy law review-styled analysis of the econom-
ic principles at play in this antitrust scenario, Judge Michael
concluded that, both the supply of and demand for vermiculite
being relatively inelastic, Grace's market share-alleged to be
fifty-seven percent in 1992-sufficed to permit a finding of the
exercise of monopoly power for purposes of allowing VVL to
proceed on its claims.'77 Despite recognizing that competitors
"normally can refuse to deal at whim with rivals or to aid com-
petitors," Judge Michael found that VVL's allegations of Grace's
conduct in reducing both the supply and output of vermiculite
through its donation to HGSI sufficiently stated a claim that
Grace refused to deal with its competitors in a manner prohib-
ited by Section 2.Y "A competitor's unilateral refusal to deal
with rivals may violate Section 2 if the purpose or effect is to
create or maintain a monopoly."' 7' The court therefore rejected
Grace's numerous attempts to distinguish or otherwise criticize
the decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
173. "[Clonviction by the court that the plaintiff will not succeed on his claim does
not justify dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff has colorably stated the
allegations necessary to his cause of action." Id. (citing Advanced Health-Care Serv. v.
Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 145 n.8 (4th Cir. 1990)).
174. "To state a claim of monopolization, a private antitrust plaintiff must allege
'possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,' 'willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Id. at 821-22 (quoting
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19 (1985)).
175. "To state a claim of attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must allege 'a
specific intent to monopolize a relevant market, predatory or anti-competitive acts,
and a dangerous probability of successful monopolization." Id. at 821 (quoting Aspen
Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 596 n.19).
176. 'To state a claim of conspiracy to monopolize the plaintiff must allege a con-
spiracy, an overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, a substantial effect
on commerce, and specific intent to monopolize." Id. at 822 (citing United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947)).
177. See id. at 823-28.
178. Id. at 825.
179. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483
n.32 (1992)).
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Corp., 18 and found that VVL adequately alleged anti-competi-
live conduct such that its Section 2 claims passed muster at
this initial stage of the litigation. 8' Furthermore, the court
was unpersuaded by Grace's arguments that its transaction
with HGSI qualified it for a "sizeable" tax deduction, thereby
qualifying as a legitimate business reason justifying its con-
duct.182
Previously, Judge Michael handled the protracted antitrust
litigation in Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co.,"8 involv-
ing Virginia Panel's (VPC) claims of patent infringement and
false advertising against defendant Mac Panel Company (MPC).
MPC levied its own counterclaims and affirmative defenses of
patent misuse and anti-competitive behavior, including monopo-
lization and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act."8 The court bifurcated the trial into two
phases: (a) patent infringement issues and (b) patent misuse,
anti-competitive behavior and false advertising issues." Dur-
ing the first proceeding, the jury returned a verdict of over $1.2
million for VPC on its infringement claims."8
Prior to the second trial phase, VPC moved for leave to file a
renewed motion for summary judgment on MPC's monopoliza-
tion and attempted monopolization counterclaims. VPC contend-
ed that, because the jury previously had found that VPC had a
valid patent that MPC was infringing, it merely was "exploiting
a legitimate competitive advantage" arising out of such patent,
which was insufficient to constitute exclusionary conduct."s7 In.
response, MPC argued, among other things, that VPC attempt-
ed to extend its patent rights beyond the scope of the patent,
thereby resulting in antitrust violations." Without addressing
the merits of either party's arguments, Judge Michael found
that evidence suggesting that VPC had used its patent rights to
attempt to tie in sales of non-patented component parts and to
180. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
181. See Virginia Vermiculite, 965 F. Supp. at 826.
182. See id. at 827.
183. 887 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Va. 1995).
184. See id. at 884, 889.
185. See id. at 883.
186. See id. at 884.
187. Id. at 889.
188. See id.
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preclude sales by others of non-patented component parts was
sufficient to preclude summary judgment on MPC's monopoliza-
tion and attempted monopolization claims.'89
The jury in the second proceeding finding that VPC, in fact,
had misused its patents and had engaged in anti-competitive
behavior, awarded MPC over $152,000 in untrebled damag-
es."9 The jury also found that MPC had engaged in false ad-
vertising and awarded VPC almost $65,000.191
Numerous post-trial motions were filed, including a motion
by VPC to set aside the jury's adverse verdict on MPC's monop-
olization claims against it.' 92 As to VPC's arguments that
MPC impermissibly defined the relevant product market to be
limited only to those products covered by the patent in suit,
Judge Michael noted that the question was "properly character-
ized as the quintessential 'battle of the experts.""9 Judge Mi-
chael concluded, however, that there was ample evidence of-
fered by MPC's expert to suggest that he utilized proper meth-
odology upon which the jury could base its finding of the rele-
vant market."
As to whether VPC's infringement notices to MPC's custom-
ers constituted antitrust violations, the court noted that where
such litigation threats have the effect of eliminating competition
and of monopolizing the relevant market by ninety percent, the
conduct may reasonably be characterized as anti-competi-
tive.'95 The court also noted that evidence adduced at trial
showed that MPC was VPC's only viable competitor in the
relevant market, and VPC's conduct actually succeeded in re-
ducing MPC's market share from twenty-one percent to ten
percent.' In addition, the court found that the jury reason-
ably could find that VPC's threat to void warranties of custom-
ers using non-VPC components with VPC's products effectively
189. See id.
190. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., No. 93-0006-H, 1996 WL 335381
at *1 (W.D. Va. May 29, 1996).
191. See id.
192. See id. at *5.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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extended VPC's lawful monopoly power derived from its patent-
ed product to include those items MPC could sell legally with-
out infringing VPC's patent.197
VPC also argued that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port a jury verdict that VPC acted with specific intent to at-
tempt to monopolize a relevant product market.98 The court
recognized that MPC must have shown that (1) VPC formed a
specific intent to monopolize the relevant product market; (2)
VPC engaged in anti-competitive or predatory conduct designed
to further that intent; and (3) there existed a dangerous proba-
bility that VPC would succeed.' 9 Relying on Abcor Corp. v.
AM International Inc., 20 0 VPC argued that specific intent is
shown by direct evidence that a defendant sought to create a
monopoly by circumventing the competitive process."° MPC
argued from M&M Medical Supplies & Services Inc. v. Pleasant
Valley Hospital, Inc., °s that specific intent may be inferred
generally from the defendant's anti-competitive practices.
Judge Michael concluded that the evidence, taken as a whole,
presented a sufficient basis from which the jury properly could
have concluded that VPC possessed the specific intent to mo-
nopolize the market. VPC's conduct constituting patent misuse,
sending infringement notices, threatening to void warranties,
and exploiting its patented products to increase sales of its
unpatented products, provided ample evidence of anti-competi-
tive behavior from which the jury could have arrived at its
finding of the specific intent to monopolize." In addition,
Judge Michael concluded that this same evidence supported a
finding that VPC's attempts to squeeze MPC out of the market
had a "significantly dangerous probability of success."2°
Hence, the court overruled VPC's post-trial motions on MPC's
counterclaim of attempted monopolization. °5
197. See id.
198. See id. at *7.
199. See id (citing Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp.,
910 F.2d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990)).
200. 916 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1990).
201. See id. at 926.
202. 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992).
203. See Virginia Panel Corp., 1996 WL 335381, at *7.
204. Id. at *8.
205. See id.
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Finally, the court concluded that MPC presented adequate
evidence of actual antitrust injury, and that the jury properly
considered VPC's arguments of mitigation.2" For example,
MPC established a total actual lost profit figure by calculating
the actual amount of its lost sales over a nine-quarter period
(during which MPC's market share waned in the relevant mar-
ket) and by applying MPC's incremental profit margin." Be-
cause the jury awarded the full amount requested, the court
concluded that the jury considered VPC's evidence, which sug-
gested that MPC's loss of market share was "attributable to
legitimately competitive factors."
On a rather unique antitrust front, in Sofer v. United
States,2 9 Judge Kellam, of the Eastern District of Virginia,
held that a cable operator's refusal to air plaintiff's editorial
advertisement, and the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and City of Chesapeake's concurrence in the cable
operator's right to do so, did not violate Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.210
Plaintiff had sought to purchase programming time on defen-
dant TCI's cable system to air the following advertisement:
BULLETIN
MESSIAH IS HERE!
RAPTURE IS ON!
call for facts
1-900-???-????
$1.99/min., must be 18211
TCI refused, claiming full editorial discretion to reject commer-
cial advertisements, and the FCC and the City of Chesapeake
supported TCI's right to reject the advertisement.'
206. See id. at *7.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. No. 2:94CV1182, 1995 WL 576833 (E.D. Va. June 7, 1995).
210. See id. at *4.
211. Id. at *1.
212. See id.
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Plaintiff brought suit against TCI, the FCC, the City of Ches-
apeake, and the United States, claiming that TCrs refusal
constituted a violation of the Communications Act,21 the Ca-
ble Act,214 the Sherman Act,2"5 the Clayton Act,216 the First
Amendment217  and the Civil Rights Act.218 After denying
plaintiff's motion to add the United Nations, the Roman
Catholic Church, Pope John Paul H and former President
George Bush as defendants, the district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all claims.219
In particular, Judge Kellam found plaintiffs antitrust claims
deficient in that plaintiff failed to establish a competitive rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendant, or an area of effective
competition.' Moreover, the court found insufficient indicia of
a conspiracy merely in the FCC and the City of Chesapeake's
concurrence in TCrs determination that it had full editorial
discretion to reject the commercial advertisement."2
D. Antitrust Injury and Standing
In three separate decisions discussed above, the Fourth Cir-
cuit demonstrated its reluctance to entertain claims in which
antitrust plaintiffs failed to bring forth clear evidence of injury
to competition. For example, in Howerton v. Grace Hospital,
Inc.,' the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment by the district court in favor of the defendants, which
noted that plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of antitrust
213. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
214. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1994).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994).
217. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
218. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1985 (1994).
219. See Sofer v. United States, No. 2:94CV1182, 1995 WL 576833, at *5 (E.D. Va.
June 7, 1995).
220. See id. at *4.
221. See id.
222. No. 95-2549, 1995 WL 498095 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996).
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injury.' The court reasoned that the only injury shown was
a result of competition, not an injury to competition itself."
Similarly, in Strauss v. Peninsula Regional Medical Cen-
ter,' the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of
plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.
In so doing, the court recognized that plaintiffs were alleging,
at most, harm to themselves as individual competitors rather
than cognizable harm to competition in general.'
Finally, in Patel v. Scotland Memorial Hospital, 7 the
Fourth Circuit found that Dr. Patel had failed to adequately
allege an antitrust injury, whether through establishing a per
se illegal agreement with plainly anti-competitive effects, or
through the "rule of reason" approach.' The court found that
Dr. Patel alleged only that the defendants destroyed her medi-
cal practice, causing economic injury to her alone, rather than
that their conduct adversely affected competition in the market
for anesthesiology services." Affirming the lower court's dis-
missal on this basis, the court held that a staffing decision by a
single hospital as to a single practitioner, in the absence of
harm to the relevant market, does not constitute an antitrust
injury.230
In the only district court opinion addressing standing, Judge
Jackson L. Kiser dismissed on summary judgment plaintiffs'
price fixing class action suit on the grounds that plaintiffs
failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that they had been
injured by the milk price fixing conspiracy they had alleged. 1
In a detailed discussion of the testimony of plaintiffs' chief
223. See Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., No. 4:90CV187, 1995 WL 787529 (W.D.N.C.
July 7, 1995); see also supra text accompanying notes 26-43.
224. See Howerton, 1995 WL 787529 at *14.
225. No. 95-2424, 1996 WL 265928 (4th Cir. May 20, 1996).
226. See id. at *2.
227. No. 95-2704, 1996 WL 383920 (4th Cir. July 10, 1996) cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
767 (1997).
228. See id. at *4; see also supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
229. See Patel, 1996 WL 383920, at *4.
230. See id.
231. See Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., Nos. 93-
0968-R and 96-0407-R, slip op. at 16 (W. D. Va., August 27, 1997) (order and memo-
randum opinion granting non-settling defendants summary judgment); see also supra
text accompanying notes 1-23.
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witness, the sole evidence of the alleged conspiracy, who
testified that his discussion with another dairy had "no applica-
tion" to plaintiffs, the court ruled that "plaintiffs are no longer
able to demonstrate that a jury question exists that the prod-
ucts they purchased from [the dairies] were a subject of the
conspiracy." 2
E. Exemptions and Immunities
The United States Supreme Court issued one antitrust deci-
sion of significance in 1996, in which it alffrmed an extension
of the federal antitrust exemption to employers' collective bar-
gaining agreements. In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Na-
tional Football League and the NFL Players Association, a
labor union, began to negotiate a new contract after their col-
lective bargaining agreement expired in 1987.' In March of
1989, the NFL presented a plan that would permit each mem-
ber club to establish a developmental squad of up to six rookie
or substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same
$1,000 weekly salary.' The union disagreed and insisted that
developmental players be provided with benefits and protections
similar to those of regular players, and that they be free to ne-
gotiate their own salaries."5 In June 1989, the two groups
reached an impasse in negotiations, at which point the NFL
unilaterally implemented the plan, warning club owners that if
they paid developmental players more or less than $1,000 per
week, they would face disciplinary action, including the loss of
draft choices." In May of 1990, 235 developmental players
filed an antitrust suit against the League and its member
clubs, claiming that the employer's agreement to pay a fixed
salary restrained trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.m
232. Marlinton, slip op. at 13.
233. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
234. See id. at 2119.
235. See idi
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
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After a jury trial, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia entered judgment for the players and
awarded treble damages in excess of $30 million. 9 The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed on grounds that the League was
immune from liability under a federal antitrust exemption for
restraints on competition imposed through the collective-bar-gaining process.' ° The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals, holding that federal labor laws shield
from antitrust attack agreements among employers bargaining
together to implement after impasse the terms of their last best
good-faith wage offer."'
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, recognized that the
Court previously had found in the labor laws an implicit non-
statutory antitrust exemption that applies where needed to
make the collective bargaining process work. 2 Breyer noted
that it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, "to require
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at
the same time to forbid them to make among themselves or
with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements
potentially necessary to make the process work or its results
mutually acceptable."' Therefore, Breyer concluded that
"some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining
process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions."' The
Court held that subjecting the post-impasse imposition to anti-
trust law might introduce instability and uncertainty into the
collective-bargaining process, since antitrust laws often forbid
and discourage the "kinds of joint discussions and behavior that
collective-bargaining invites or requires."2' The Court ex-
pressed concern about allowing courts to apply the antitrust
laws to determine whether particular kinds of employer under-
standings are "reasonable" where justified by collective bargain-
ing necessity.' Such a practice, the Court feared, would lead
to a "web of detailed rules spun by many different nonexpert
239. See id.
240. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
241. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2117-18.
242. See id. at 2120.
243. Id. (emphasis in original).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2123.
246. See id.
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antitrust judges and juries," instead of a set of labor rules en-
forced by the Labor Board. 47
The Court rejected as unworkable the Petitioners' claim that
the exemption applied only to labor-management agreements.
The Court also rejected the Solicitor General's argument that
the exemption should terminate at the point of impasse.'
The Court did, however, caution that an agreement among
employers could be sufficiently distant in time and circumstanc-
es from the collective bargaining process to fall outside of the
exemption. 9 The lone dissent from the Court's opinion was
filed by Justice Stevens, who argued that the Court was ex-
panding the limited nonstatutory exemption to new ground, a
role for Congress, not the Court.'0
The Fourth Circuit considered the State of South Carolina
exempt from antitrust liability under the circumstances present-
ed in Dehoney v. South Carolina Department of Corrections."'
In Dehoney, the plaintiff, a state inmate in South Carolina,
brought a pro se action alleging that the Department of Correc-
tions had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by requiring
all prisoners to purchase their goods from the prison canteen at
a ten percent markup." Finding that the canteen was state
run, and therefore not subject to the antitrust laws, the federal
magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the
defendant's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The magistrate judge not-
ed that "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."'
Moreover, the magistrate judge noted that in adopting and
enforcing the canteen program, South Carolina "made no con-
tract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint
247. Id.
248. See id. at 2124-25.
249. See id- at 2127.
250. See id. at 2134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. No. 95-7270, 1995 WL 736863 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1995).
252. See Dehoney v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 1995 WL 842006 (D.S.C.
July 31, 1995); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
253. See Dehoney, 1995 WL 842006, at *4.
254. Id.
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of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the
restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did
not undertake to prohibit." 5 The district court for the District
of South Carolina adopted the magistrate judge's report and
dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).' On review,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in
a one-paragraph per curiam opinion."
Earlier this year, the Eastern District of Virginia also ad-
dressed several immunities to the antitrust laws in the matter
of Forest Ambulance Services, Inc. v. Mercy Ambulance of Rich-
mond, Inc.' In 1990, the City of Richmond became the first
locality in Virginia to act on state legislation authorizing mu-
nicipal regulation of "emergency medical services vehicles"
through franchising and permitting. 9 The City enacted an
ordinance extending permits to all volunteer rescue squads then
in operation and granting an interim permit to defendant Mul-
ti-Hospital High-Tech Services (MHS), a partnership of several
hospitals, allowing MHS to transport patients between its mem-
bers.2" In 1991, the City adopted a subsequent ordinance cre-
ating a monopoly over the emergency medical services system
and creating the Richmond Ambulance Authority (RAA), a non-
profit governmental entity, to oversee the system."' RAA
owns and maintains the ambulances but contracts out their
operation, at the time to Mercy Ambulance of Richmond, Inc.
(Mercy). 2
Plaintiff Forest Ambulance Service, Inc. (Forest), was one of
three existing major ambulance services when the City entered
the market, and the only service that was unsuccessful in ob-
taining a permit to operate within the City under the new
ordinance.2" Forest brought a two-count complaint against the
City, RAA and the other ambulance companies, alleging a host
255. Id.
256. See id. at *2.
257. See Dehoney v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, No. 95-7270, 1995 WL
736863 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1995).
258. 952 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Va. 1997).
259. See id. at 298.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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of antitrust violations as well as violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.' Among Forest's antitrust allegations were the follow-
ing: (1) that the City, RAA and Mercy combined to implement
the monopolization of the ambulance market; (2) that the defen-
dants created unreasonable barriers to obtaining a permit; (3)
that MHS was the only private ambulance service granted a
permit to operate in the city; (4) that Lifeline Ambulance, the
only major provider other than MHS and Forest, was operating
under MHS' permit without the City's consent; (5) that Forest,
therefore, was the only major private ambulance provider of
non-emergency services not permitted to operate in the City; (6)
that all of the defendants had combined or conspired to monop-
olize and restrain trade; and (7) that the defendants' acts were
designed to selectively allow competition in the market for
ambulance services, to Forest's exclusion.2"
Before addressing the merits of Forest's antitrust claims, the
court initially ruled, citing Ninth Circuit precedent, that
Forest's shareholders, who were named as plaintiffs along with
the company, lacked standing to bring suit on the ground that
the individuals had neither suffered nor alleged any antitrust
injury as a result of the challenged conduct.'
The court next held that the Local Government Antitrust Act
barred Forest's claims for treble and other money damages
against the Richmond City Council, also named as a defen-
dant.17 The court also ruled that where, as here, the legisla-
tive authority for municipal regulation of ambulance services
clearly anticipated anti-competitive conduct, the state action
immunity doctrine under Parker v. Brown,m provides immu-
nity from claims under the Sherman Act, including both injunc-
tive and monetary relief. 9 In so holding, the court rejected
Forest's argument for application of a "proprietary interest"
exception to municipal immunity which applies to municipal-
264. See id-
265. See id. at 298-99.
266. See id. at 299 (citing Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 1372, 1375
(9th Cir. 1996)).
267. See id.
268. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
269. See Forest Ambulance Serv., 952 F. Supp. at 299.
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ities acting as active market participants.27 Rather, assuming
without deciding that such an exception exists, the court held
that the City's subsidization of RAA's operation was inconsis-
tent with the role of a market participant.
271
With respect to the private defendants, the Court declined to
address the issue of whether they were protected by the state
action doctrine, finding instead that they clearly were entitled
to Noerr-Pennington immunity under Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight272 and United Mine Workers
v. Pennington..27 Although Forest urged a "commercial excep-
tion" to the doctrine-that the challenged conduct is primarily
the result of commercial, rather than political motivations-the
Court held that no such exception had been recognized by the
courts.274 The court also rejected out of hand Forest's argu-
ment that because MHS' permit had become invalidated due to
a change in ownership, which was prohibited by the ordinance,
MHS should be divested of its immunity.
275
Finally, the court found that the antitrust claims against
RAA must be dismissed, as either being barred by the Local
Government Antitrust Act and Parker state action immunity for
government actors or by Noerr-Pennington immunity for private
actors.
276
F. Practice and Procedure
In a terse per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on
procedural grounds in Martinez v. Roig.277 In Martinez, plain-
tiff anesthesiologist brought antitrust claims arising from his
peer review, termination of medical staff privileges, and loss of
medical malpractice insurance.27 Although disagreeing with
270. See id. at 301.
271. See id.
272. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
273. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
274. See Forest Ambulance Serv., 952 F. Supp. at 302.
275. See id. at 303.
276. See id.
277. Nos. 93-1309, 93-1389, 93-1390, 93-1409, 1995 WL 626512 (4th Cir. Oct. 25,
1995).
278. See id. at *6.
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the district court's holding that plaintiffs claims were barred by
res judicata or claim preclusion, the appellate court found that
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion did bar such claims.27
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's denial of
sanctions.
III. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATVE AND
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
A. Antitrust Division Civil Investigations
On August 22, 1996, the United States filed a civil action in
United States District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, against
Universal Shippers Association alleging that it had violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into an agreement
with an ocean common carrier that unreasonably restrained
competition for ocean transportation services.' The alleged il-
legal agreement between Universal and the common carrier
contained an "automatic rate differential clause,"28 which pro-
vided that the carrier would guarantee Universal shipping rates
and charges at least five percent less than those given to com-
peting shippers and shippers' associations.'es
On the same day the action was filed, the United States and
Universal filed a Stipulation by which they consented to the
entry of a Final Judgment to undo the challenged agreement
279. See id. at n.1.
280. See United States v. Universal Shippers Ass'n, 1996 WL 760279, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 6, 1996). A shippers' association is "a group of ocean transportation custom-
ers ('shippers) that consolidates or distributes freight for its members on a nonprofit
basis in order to secure volume discounts." Id. As a shippers' association, Universal
accounts for about half of the wine and spirits carried across the North Atlantic. See
id.
281. An "automatic rate differential clause" as defined by the court is
any provision in a contract the defendant has with an ocean common
carrier or conference that requires the ocean common carrier or confer-
ence to maintain a differential in rates, whether expressed as a percent-
age or as a specific amount, between rates charged by the ocean common
carrier or conference to the defendant under the contract and rates
charged by the ocean common carrier or conference to any other shipper
of the same or competing commodities for lesser volumes.
Id. at *1.
282. See i at *4.
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and prevent recurrence of such agreements in the future.' In
this consent decree, District Court Judge Bryan enjoined the
defendant from "maintaining, adopting, agreeing to, abiding by,
or enforcing an automatic rate differential clause in any con-
tract."' The court also nullified and voided all rate differen-
tial clauses in any of the defendant's other shipping con-
tracts.' The court noted that entry of the consent decree
would neither impair nor assist a private litigant in bringing
an action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.'
B. Criminal Enforcement Efforts
As part of a continuing investigation by the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division, six individuals have been convicted
in the last two years of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act
by rigging bids at residential real estate foreclosure auctions in
Northern Virginia." The individuals allegedly conspired with
real estate speculators not to bid against each other at certain
real estate foreclosure auctions, allowing the participants to
obtain real estate at low, non-competitive prices. They would
then meet secretly and hold a second auction during which each
conspirator bid an amount above the public auction price. The
conspirator who bid the highest amount won the property. That
amount was the group's illicit profit, which was divided among
the conspirators in payoffs made later.
In September of 1995, Donald M. Kotowicz, Alexander Giap,
and Leo E. Gulley pled guilty for participation in the conspira-
cy. Similarly, in November of 1996, G. Frank Stinnet pled
guilty to the same charges and was sentenced to three years'
probation. In 1997, Mija S. Romer and Khem C. Batra were
convicted after a trial as part of the same investigation. The
court sentenced Romer to a $20,000 fine and 547 days in jail
283. See id. at *3.
284. Id. at *2.
285. See id.
286. See id. at *6.
287. See United States v. Romer, Criminal No. 96-350-A-(1,2) (E.D. Va. Apr. 18,
1997); United States v. Stinnet, Criminal No. 96-00435-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 1996);
United States v. Kotowicz, Crim. No. 95-414-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 1995); United
States v. Giap, Crim. No. 95-415-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 1995); United States v. Gulley,
Crim. No. 95-416-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 1995).
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for bid rigging, and three years probation for bank fraud. Katra
was sentenced to ninety days in jail and three years probation
for bid rigging. In all, the investigation has resulted in the
convictions of twelve individuals and one corporation, and is
continuing.
C. Enforcement Guidelines Issued
1. Clarification of Efficiencies Analysis.
In April, 1997, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
issued a Revision to Section 4 of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines' clarifying its efficiencies analysis in the merger
context. The revised guidelines reemphasize that the Depart-
ment of Justice will consider only those efficiencies likely to be
accomplished by the proposed merger and unlikely to be accom-
plished in the absence of the proposed merger. 9 The guide-
lines also emphasize that the merging firms must substantiate
efficiency claims so that government regulators can verify (1)
the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, (2)
how and when they would be achieved, (3) how each would
enhance the mergej entity's ability and incentive to compete,
(4) and why each would only be realized through a merger.'o
Efficiency claims that are vague, speculative or unverifiable will
not be considered."'
The revised guidelines make clear that resulting efficiencies
rarely will justify an otherwise anti-competitive merger and will
almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopo-
ly.' Resulting efficiencies are most likely to make a differ-
ence where the likely adverse competitive effects from the
merger, absent the efficiencies, are not great. To make a differ-
ence, the efficiencies must be likely to reverse the merger's
potential harm to consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by
preventing price increases in the market. The revised guide-
288. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1997).
289. See id. at 30.
290. See id. at 31.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 32.
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lines, however, specifically note that efficiencies relating to
procurement and management are less likely to meet this stan-
dard.293
The revised guidelines provide new insight into how govern-
ment regulators are likely to view certain types of efficiencies.
While government regulators may view efficiencies affecting
management and procurement more skeptically, it remains
important that merging entities thoroughly document expected
efficiencies prior to consummation of the merger.
2. Expanded Health Care Enforcement Policy
On August 28, 1996, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued newly revised State-
ments of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care' which
contain significantly expanded discussions of the antitrust prin-
ciples that the DOJ and the FTC apply when analyzing physi-
cian network joint ventures and multiprovider networks. The
nine statements revisit and elaborate on a set of similar
statements the DOJ and the FTC issued in 1993 and revised in
1994. The statements also contain new hypothetical examples
involving physician hospital organizations and "messenger mod-
el" arrangements designed to avoid unlawful price agreements.
The revised statements still contain safety zones, and clarify
that conduct falling outside the safety zones is not necessarily
anti-competitive and likely to be challenged. The revised state-
ments assist practitioners by providing them with the analysis
used by agencies reviewing conduct that falls outside the safety
zones.
3. State-Federal Criminal Prosecution Protocol
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ also announced a new
protocol for increased state prosecution of criminal antitrust
offenses." The protocol sets forth the circumstances under
293. See id.
294. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,153 (Aug. 28, 1996).
295. A full copy of the text of the Protocol is reprinted at 70 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1755, at 362 (Mar. 28, 1996).
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which the Antitrust Division may transfer to State Attorneys
General prosecutorial responsibility, including relevant evidence,
for certain antitrust offenses, such as price fixing and bid rig-
ging, which have particularly local impacts.' Transfer will
depend in large measure on whether the State Attorney G-ener-
al has the legal and personnel re-sources to undertake the
criminal prosecution and whether the State Attorney General is
indeed willing to undertake the prosecution. 7
IV. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT AcTvTIEs OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA
Attorney General James S. Gilmore, III announced on Janu-
ary 30, 1997, that his Office had participated in a multi-state
investigation of antitrust violations by a manufacturer of farm
chemicals, in Missouri v. American Cyanamid Co. 8 On Janu-
ary 30, 1997, all fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puer-
to Rico settled claims that American Cyanamid (AmCy), a man-
ufacturer of agricultural chemicals, entered into resale price
maintenance agreements with its retail dealers. According to
the complaint, which was filed simultaneously with the settle-
ment, AmCy, a Maine corporation that has its principal place of
business in New Jersey, used its "Cash Reward on Perfor-
mance" and "Award for Professional Excellence" incentive pro-
grams to establish floor prices to be charged by the retail deal-
ers when making retail sales of certain crop protection chemi-
cals.2' These floor prices were AmCy's wholesale prices. Deal-
ers received monetary rebates from AmCy only for retail sales
made above the floor prices established in the written contracts.
Dealers therefore only earned profits on retail sales of the af-
fected crop protection chemicals if they earned a rebate or
charged a price that exceeded the floor prices. Under the terms
of the contracts executed under the incentive programs, AmCy
was entitled to audit each dealer's records to ensure compliance
with the floor prices."
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. No. 97-4024, 1997 WL 129408 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 30, 1997).
299. See In re American Cyanamid, F.T.C. No. C. -3739 (1997).
300. See id.
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The settlement agreement reached with AmCy provides for a
$7.3 million payment to the states"0 1 and enjoins AmCy, for a
period of ten years, from conditioning the payment of any re-
bate or other incentive to any dealer, in whole or in part, on
the price charged by that dealer and otherwise agreeing on
prices to be charged by any dealer."° The FTC similarly en-
tered into a consent order which would prohibit AmCy from
agreeing to pay its dealers substantial rebates if the dealers
sell AmCy chemicals above specified prices.0 3
In another enforcement action, Attorney General Gilmore
announced on December 18, 1996, that Virginia and twenty-two
other states filed an antitrust lawsuit in federal court against
three contact lens manufacturers, eight optometric associations
and eight optometrists, alleging a conspiracy to limit the avail-
ability of contact lenses from retail businesses other than op-
tometrists.' ° The lawsuit alleged that Vistakon (a Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. company), Bausch & Lomb, Inc., CIBA Vision
Corp., and optometrists, individually and through their profes-
sional associations, including the American Optometric Asso-
ciation, conspired to restrain consumer access to the prescrip-
tions needed to obtain contact lenses and eliminate the supply
of contact lenses to mail order companies, pharmacies, buying
clubs, department stores, mass merchandise outlets, and other
alternative channels of distribution. The amended complaint
alleged that, absent this unlawful conspiracy, contact lenses
would now be more widely available at a much lower cost.
According to the amended complaint, the conspiracy began
when disposable contact lenses were first introduced. From that
time, the defendants jointly tried to keep lenses from being sold
by anyone other than a licensed eye care practitioner who was
selling to his or her own patients. Optometrists used their col-
lective leverage against the lens manufacturers who agreed to
supply only the eye care practitioners. The manufacturers de-
veloped almost identical policies against selling to mail order
companies, pharmacies, and other similar outlets and began to
301. See American Cyanamid, 1997 WL 129408 at *2.
302. See id. at "1.
303. See id.
304. See California v. American Optometric Ass'n, No. 96 Civ. 6200 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 18, 1996).
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increase the enforcement of those policies in response to de-
mands by the optometrists. Once the cheaper sources for lenses
were eliminated, optometrists would not be faced with competi-
tion for the sale of lenses. The conspiracy thus had the effect of
keeping the price of contact lenses artificially high.
The amended complaint also alleged that optometrists shared
ideas on how to keep patients from obtaining their prescriptions
for contact lenses. They would either refuse to release the pre-
scription or put limits and conditions on the release so that it
could not be used to obtain lenses from other sources.
Finally, the Commonwealth of Virginia also participated in a
civil antitrust action against Reebok and its subsidiary,
Rockport."0 5 The Attorneys General of the fifty states and
territories filed a suit as parens patriae on behalf of individuals
in their states who had purchased certain models of Reebok
and Rockport brand athletic and casual footwear between Janu-
ary 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994."° The defendants were
alleged to have fixed prices by conspiring with various dis-
tributors to sell some of their products to consumers at or
above certain Tninimum prices, forcing consumers to pay higher
prices for them than they would have paid if there had been no
agreements.0 7
On October 20, 1995, United States District Court Judge
John G. Koeltl granted final approval of a settlement between
the parties.0 8 As part of the settlement, Reebok and Rockport
denied all liability but, nonetheless, agreed to pay $1.5 million
to cover attorneys' fees and costs, and $8 million for distribu-
tion to the states and territories to be used to benefit athletic
purchases and improvement or construction of facilities.!°
Virginia's share of the settlement amounted to $194,295, which
was divided among projects in localities throughout the Com-
monwealth. Reebok also agreed to an injunction providing that
it will not violate specified provisions of the antitrust laws for
305. See New York v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), appeal
dismissed, 96 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996).
306. See id. at 532-33.
307. See id. at 533-34.
308. See id. at 538.
309. See id. at 534.
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five years and that it will notify its dealers that they are free
to price and advertise Reebok products however they
choose.310
Subsequently, the purported victims of the alleged violations
appealed to the Second Circuit, challenging the settlement.3"'
The Second Circuit, however, dismissed the appeal, finding that
appellants lacked standing to appeal"' or, alternatively, as-
suming arguendo they did have standing, the appeal was with-
out merit."
V. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
A. Federal Legislation
Numerous bills were introduced this past year which impact
on antitrust issues. Only one such bill has been passed to date;
the remainder remain in Committee for hearing and further
study.
1. Passed Legislation
On July 3, 1997, the Charitable Donation Antitrust Immunity
Act of 1997.. amended the Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust
Relief Act of 1995... and immunized donations made in the
form of charitable gift annuities and charitable remainder
trusts from the federal antitrust laws and their state law coun-
terparts.
2. Legislation in Committee
The Television Improvement Act of 1997..6 was introduced
in the Senate on April 9, 1997, and in the House on May 1,
1997. This bill proposes to exempt agreements relating to vol-
310. See id. at 535.
311. See New York v. Reebok Ltd., 96 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996).
312. See id. at 46-48.
313. See id. at 49-50.
314. Pub. L. No. 105-26, 111 Stat. 241 (1997).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 37 (1996).
316. H.R. 1510, S. 539, 105th Cong. (1997).
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untary guidelines governing telecast material from the applica-
bility of the antitrust laws. It has been referred to the Commit-
tee on Judiciary in House and Senate.
The Fishing Industry Bargaining Acts" was introduced on
April 9, 1997. This bill proposes to exempt persons engaged in
the fishing industry from certain federal antitrust laws. Specif-
ically, it authorizes fishermen or planters of aquatic products to
collectively agree with fish processors on the price paid to the
fishermen or planters for aquatic products and on the minimum
price that fish processors may accept for the sale of an aquatic
product. The bill also proposes to exempt such agreement from
federal antitrust laws, providing that a price paid pursuant to
such agreement shall not constitute a monopolization or re-
straint of trade in interstate or foreign commerce. The bill has
been referred to the Committee on Judiciary.
The Electric Consumers' Power to Choose Act of 1997,"18 in-
troduced on February 10, 1997, proposes to give consumers the
right to choose among competitive providers of electricity in
order to secure lower rates, higher quality services, and a more
robust economy. The bill has been referred to the House Com-
merce Committee.
The Give Fans a Chance Act of 1997..9 was introduced on
February 5, 1997, and proposes to amend the Act of September
30, 1961, limiting the antitrust exemption applicable to
broadcasting agreements made by professional sports leagues,
and for other purposes. The bill has been referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary.
The Curt Flood Act of 199720 was introduced on January
21, 1997. This bill proposes to amend the Clayton Act3 21 to
require the general application of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball, and specifically to the amateur draft, minor
leagues and restraint on franchise relocation, among others.
The bill has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary, with
some hearings held already.
317. S. 533, 105th Cong. (1997).
318. H.R. 655, 105th Cong. (1997).
319. H.R. 590, 105th Cong. (1997).
320. S. 53, 105th Cong. (1997).
321. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1994).
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The Antitrust Health Care Advancement Act of 1997," in-
troduced on January 9, 1997, proposes to modify the application
of the antitrust laws to health care provider networks that
provide health care services, and for other purposes. It also
provides that certain activities shall not be deemed illegal per
se in any action under the federal antitrust laws or similar
state law, but shall be judged based on reasonableness. The bill
has been referred to the House Committee on Judiciary.
The Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1997"
was introduced on January 9, 1997. This bill proposes to modify
the application of the antitrust laws to encourage the licensing
and other use of certain intellectual property. The bill has been
referred to the House Committee on Judiciary.
B. Virginia State Legislation
The Virginia General Assembly did not pass any significant
antitrust legislation in the past two years.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bringing an antitrust action in Virginia remains a course of
conduct not to be undertaken by the faint of heart. Rarely do
these actions meet with success at trial, and they are routinely
dismissed in pretrial proceedings. While the language of the
antitrust statutes themselves appears expansive, the required
elements of these offenses developed over the years by the
courts make it difficult to get these actions to a jury.
On the enforcement and legislative end, recent activity exhib-
its a definite consumer welfare orientation. Both of the actions
joined by the Virginia Attorney General's office were resale
price maintenance claims brought to curb efforts by large man-
ufacturers to keep the price of agricultural chemicals and ath-
letic shoes above competitive levels. The legislative front saw no
sweeping changes, and the bills being considered tend to in-
volve consumer issues or industry-specific exemptions. Of inter-
322. H.R. 415, 105th Cong. (1997).
323. H.R. 401, 105th Cong. (1997).
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est are the proposed bills to eliminate baseball's antitrust ex-
emption and the proposed bill to carve out an exception to the
per se rule for certain actions of health care providers.

